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1 Introduction
The macroeconomic conditions faced by workers entering the labor market for the first
time may persistently affect their future labor market outcomes and wellbeing. The
accumulated evidence mainly focuses on the negative effects of business cycle on future
wages and employment prospects of young entrants (Brunner and Kuhn, 2014, Genda
et al., 2010, Kahn, 2010, Kwon et al., 2010, Oreopoulos et al., 2012, Oyer, 2006). In
contrast, due to data limitations, little attention has been devoted to non-pecuniary job
attributes. These amenities represent an equally relevant component of the compensation
package and, especially when wages are rigid and regulated by strict institutional rules,
might constitute an important channel of adjustment to negative shocks.
This paper studies the impact of unemployment at entry on workplace safety for a
sample of young Italian-born low-medium skilled men who started their first employment
between 1994 and 2003. We employ a unique dataset for the period 1994-2003 that
combines work histories from Italian administrative data (Work Histories Italian Panel,
WHIP) with individual work-related injuries from the Italian Workers’ Compensation
Authority (INAIL). The data contain exact information on the entry date and the timing
of each workplace injury thus allowing us to implement both linear regression models and
survival analysis.
Our main finding is that negative labor market conditions at entry determine a long
run increase in the injury hazard rate by permanently increasing the number of work-
related accidents. Though this lower level of workplace safety is (at least in part) initially
compensated by higher entry wages, workers entered during recessions subsequently ex-
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perience slower wage growth whereas the level of injury risk remains persistently higher.
This temporal evolution cannot be simply ascribed to a lower accumulation of experi-
ence and/or tenure, as we do not find any significant effect of initial conditions on time
worked (conditional or unconditional on being employed) and very small negative effects
on tenure only in the long run. We also show that our findings are robust to restrict-
ing the analyses to severe injuries, which-due to their consequences and immediate care
needs- are not subject to reporting bias (Boone and van Ours, 2006, Boone et al., 2011),
and to using a measure of the risk imposed by the working environment which is not
affected by workers’ behavior in the job as dependent variable. Therefore, we argue that
our findings provide evidence on the impact of starting conditions on the time spent by
new workers in low-quality jobs offering relatively fewer career prospects.
The analysis of job safety thus appears to be particularly helpful in disentangling
the effects of unfavorable entry conditions on career prospects of young workers in labor
markets, as the Italian one, characterized by downward wage rigidities (Devicienti et al.,
2007) in which, especially for young workers (Berton and Garibaldi, 2012), wages are to
a large extent determined by collective agreements. Moreover, a typical insider-outsider
dualism emerges when wage compression is coupled with employment protection legisla-
tion (EPL), where incumbent workers are protected against external shocks and entrants
face a reduction in labor market opportunities. Such a dualism can be sustained only if
insiders are able to fix entrants’ wage in order to avoid any sort of underbidding. Due to
the existence of high labor turnover costs and insider retaliation strategies, entrants are
very unlikely to be hired on terms that go against insider interest (Bertola, 1999, Lind-
3
beck and Snower, 2001). Our findings suggest that, after the wage is set in a standard
right-to-manage framework, employers adjust compensations by varying the mix of haz-
ardous task offered to entrants. Through this channel, employers are able to mitigate the
disadvantages of wage stickiness and the entry of young workers is more easily accepted
by incumbent workers.
To the extent that hazardous tasks are associated with jobs which offer relatively
fewer opportunities for skill accumulation or are characterized by a lower transferability
of the accumulated skills to higher level occupations, our results may provide evidence
supporting human capital models, such as the theory of Gibbons and Waldman (2006),
which suggest that if during recessions entrants are assigned to these low-quality tasks,
initial conditions may have long-lasting effects. This mechanism may be reinforced by
the presence of an insider-outsider divide, as accumulating human capital is also for
labor market entrants an investment to become insiders. Therefore, with respect to labor
markets characterized by less rigid institutional settings, the incentives of entrants during
recessions to search for ”better” jobs may be comparatively lower. Indeed, we also find
that, different from that observed for other countries, entrants during unfavorable labor
market conditions do not display a higher search intensity.
As job safety effects represent a channel through which different types of jobs may
affect workers’ health conditions,1 the results of this paper also complement the studies
which relate the (initial) type of occupation to a worker’s health status (Case and Deaton,
2005, Fletcher et al., 2011, Sindelar et al., 2007). Finally, analyzing injury dynamics by
1Injuries might also lead to substantial health costs through an increase in the number of working
days lost and a (permanent) reduction of workers’ production capacity
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their severity reveals that, apart from the contemporaneous economic cycle (Boone and
van Ours, 2006, Boone et al., 2011), the starting conditions also affect worker reporting
behavior.
The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews
the economic literature on the effect of adverse conditions at entry. Section 3 describes the
data. The econometric framework and the empirical results are presented and discussed
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
Previous literature has mainly investigated the effect of high unemployment at entry on
pecuniary labor market outcomes, estimating the degree of persistence of the expected
initial adverse impact. Most of the empirical evidence analyzing the effect of unemploy-
ment at entry on wages is based on countries characterized by greater wage flexibility
than the Italian labor market. The bulk of these studies focus on entrants with at least
college education in North America (Genda et al., 2010, Kahn, 2010, Oreopoulos et al.,
2012, Oyer, 2006) and detect a wage penalty for those entered during recession which
vanishes in about ten years. However, for a sample of Austrian low and medium-skilled
workers, Brunner and Kuhn (2014) find a persistent and increasing effect of the initial
unemployment rate on wages. Genda et al. (2010) also detect a negative and persis-
tent effect of unemployment at entry on earnings for low and medium-skilled Japanese
workers, but not for their US counterparts, and argue that institutional differences (i.e.,
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stronger EPL in Japan coupled with a school-based hiring system) may contribute to
explaining this result.
Economic theory provides a wide range of possible mechanisms that can explain a per-
sistent effect of initial macroeconomic conditions on labor market outcomes. The quality
of the initial job could depend on the economic cycle and affect on-the-job human capital
accumulation. According to Gibbons and Waldman (2006), if new entrants facing poor
macroeconomic conditions enter the labor market in lower-quality jobs or in tasks which
offer relatively fewer opportunities for accumulating skills and for career progress (or are
characterized by a lower transferability of the accumulated skills to higher level occu-
pations), initial job or task assignment may have longer term consequences by affecting
actual worker productivity. Moreover, including the mere employers’ imperfect informa-
tion about worker productivity could rationalize a persistent effect of initial conditions.
According to Oyer (2006), prospective employers could perceive the initial low-rank job
as a signal of the workers’ ability, without taking into account the macroeconomic con-
ditions at the time of labor market entry. Oreopoulos et al. (2012) show that also a
standard job-search model, augmented with mobility costs that increase with job tenure
or age, is consistent with persistent effects of unfavorable initial conditions. If the ben-
efits of searching are sufficiently low (or the mobility costs increase sufficiently steeply),
the catch-up of unlucky entrants may terminate before the gap is closed. Finally, a per-
sistent effect of macroeconomic conditions at entry is also consistent with the existence
of implicit/insurance contracts (e.g. Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991, Harris and Holstrom,
1982). Workers entering the labor market during recessions may tend to accept long-term
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contracts characterized by lower wage growth and job mobility may be costly.
In presence of labor market rigidities, typical of European countries, adverse condi-
tions at entry are likely to affect other outcomes such as employment (see for instance
Raaum and Røed, 2006) or other non pecuniary characteristics. The Italian labor market
represents an interesting case to study the effect of adverse initial conditions. Among
European countries, the Italian labor market ranks the highest position in terms of em-
ployment protection legislation (EPL), wage compression and downward wage rigidity
as well as centralized wage bargaining and trade union coverage(OECD, 1999, 2004). It
is thus reasonable to expect negligible effects of adverse conditions at entry on wages.
Indeed, using the same dataset, Leombruni et al. (2013) show that Italian laid-off workers
do not experience relevant wage losses, but exhibit a considerable increase in workplace
injury risk at reemployment. As in the case of displaced workers, downward wage rigidity
is likely to be binding for low skilled labor market entrants and, therefore, it is plausible
that employers react to economic downturns by adjusting the mix of hazardous tasks
offered to entrants.2
3 Data Description
We used the WHIP-Salute database, which merges together data on work careers derived
from the administrative records of the National Social Security Administration (INPS),
with data on work injuries derived from the administrative records of the National Work
2As emphasized in the literature, the business cycle may influence workers selection into different jobs
and tasks. Several studies show that during slowdowns firms allocate incumbent workers to lower skilled
tasks (Devereux, 2000, Solon et al., 1997) or lower job levels (Baker et al., 1994)
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Injuries Insurance Administration (INAIL) (Bena et al., 2012). The target population
includes individuals who worked in the private non-agricultural sector in Italy in the
period 1985-2003, from which a 6% sample has been extracted. Career data provides job
start and job end dates, along with the actual duration in weeks of each employment
relationship. It also provides information on worker characteristics (age, sex, birthplace,
place of work, type of occupation, maternity leave and sick leave), standard labor market
outcomes (number of weeks worked in a year and annual earnings) and characteristics
of the firms in which individuals are employed (number of employees, sector and firms’
opening and closing dates). Weekly wages are computed as the ratio between annual
deflated earnings and number of weeks worked in a year, with both variables measured
on a full time equivalent scale. The INAIL dataset contains the date of workplace injuries
(i.e., accidents that have occurred during a work task), the duration of injury-related leave
at the employer-employee level and a description of the type of injury. It includes all
injuries leading to a leave of more than three days for the period 1994-2003.3 Physicians
made all diagnoses and prognoses for workers involved in these accidents. Using the
information on the diagnosis we adopt a classification of injuries to identify workplace
accidents that require immediate treatment at hospital and for this reason cannot be
subject to reporting bias (Boone and van Ours, 2006). These workplace accidents are
labeled as immediate care (IC) injuries, whereas the remaining ones are labeled as non-
immediate care injuries (NIC).
We selected Italian-born men who had their first labor market experience between
3Shorter healing periods do not involve INAIL but are the responsibility of the firm, according to
collective contract agreements.
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1994 and 2003 and who were under 24 years old at the time of entry. We define ”first-time
labor market entrants” as those workers who are observed for the first time in the sample
in 1994 or later.4 We exclude the pre-1971 birth cohorts by considering entrants who are
under 24 years old at the time of entry. The resulting sample is representative of 70% of
first time labor market entrants in Italy during 1994-2003. As the WHIP-Salute dataset
does not adequately cover the public sector, we also exclude labor market entrants and
employment spells in those industries.5 Although no information on schooling is available
in the data, the restriction on age in practice excludes individuals with higher educa-
tion/skills (i.e., those with at least a university degree)6 and therefore reduces potential
unobserved heterogeneity problems related to this important dimension. Moreover, job
safety should be less relevant for labor market entrants with higher education, who tend
to perform non-manual tasks. Therefore, due both to data limitations and for conceptual
reasons, we concentrate on low- to medium-skilled entrants. The restriction on gender
is aimed to reduce the unobserved heterogeneity that reflects the complexity of female
labor supply behavior over the life cycle.
Following the above-cited literature, we use unemployment rates to proxy for the eco-
nomic cycle. In particular, we use data on regional Italian unemployment rates for all
4We can observe the labor market history of individuals since 1985 to 2003.
5 The following ATECO 1991/ISIC rev 1.1 codes are left out of the analysis: L, M, N, O. This hardly
affects the representativeness of the data. Indeed, only 4.9% of the selected labor market entrants begin
their career in the public sector and only 4.7% of individuals in the final sample have some job spells
in the public sector. Finally, because of its high degree of seasonality and undeclared work, we checked
that our results are robust to excluding employment spells in the construction sector.
6According to the AlmaLaurea surveys (www.almalaurea.it/en/), in 2003, only 0.7 % of students
who completed their undergraduate studies were 23 y.o. or younger, with 28 being the average age of
graduation. During the previous years included in our sample the average age of graduation was even
higher.
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workers over the period 1985-2003 from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (IS-
TAT). Figure 1 depicts the national and regional unemployment rates over the 1994-2003
period. The slowdown of the Italian economy after 1993 resulted in an increasing trend
in unemployment until 1998. A recovery occurred thereafter. Italian regions markedly
differ in the level of unemployment, with the South lagging behind the developed North.
However, in order to take into account the unobserved heterogeneity connected to the
different entry cohorts and the different regional labor markets, our identification strat-
egy is conditional on the region of entry and on the year of entry. Figure 2 demonstrates
that after washing out the national trend and the time-constant regional heterogeneity,
significant cyclical differences across regions persist: this source of variation is used to
identify the effects of local business cycle fluctuations.
Table 1 includes some descriptive statistics for our sample of workers by year of entry.
The mean age at entry exhibits a slight increasing trend. The percentage of new entrant
manufacturing jobs follows a negative trend which is accompanied by a stable increase
of the proportion of entrants in the service sector. The share of workers starting their
careers as apprentices and blue collar workers is quite stable at around 88%. However,
the categorization of blue versus white collars is likely to conceal a significant amount of
heterogeneity in terms of task assignment. The proportion of entrants born in the North
of Italy exhibits a negative trend, whereas the percentage of workers born in the South
and in the islands increases over time. However, more jobs for new entrants are created
in the North, consistent with the historical economic duality between the richer North
and the less developed Southern part of the country. It is also interesting to note that
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the proportion of entrants in the Northern regions is higher during the years of increasing
unemployment and decreases during the post-1998 recovery period when the proportion
of jobs created in the Southern regions increases. Moreover, the difference between the
proportion of entrants in the Southern/(Northern) labor markets and the proportion of
entrants born in the South/(North) is always negative/(positive). This evidence points
to the relevance of mobility from the disadvantaged Southern regions toward the richer
Northern part of the country. Table 1 also describes the means of the main labor outcomes
analyzed in the paper. The number of injuries has been divided by the number of full time
equivalent paid weeks in order to take into account the exposure to risk. We report these
variables as the number of injuries per thousand of days worked to improve the readability
of the estimates (i.e., to reduce the number of decimals) . Interestingly, there is a clear
increase of both IC and NIC injuries in those years characterized by higher unemployment
rates. Figure A1 plots the log mean wage by year of experience for cohorts of workers
entered in different years. Entry wages seem to follow the same dynamics of injuries, as
they are positively correlated with unemployment rates. 7 However, at closer inspection
workers entered during the last years of recession (i.e., 1997-99) seem to experience slower
wage growth rates than the other cohorts even though they started at the highest levels
of entry wage.
7A similar trend in entry wage is also evident in Figure A3 for a comparable sample of workers selected
from the European Consumption Household Panel (ECHP) in the 1994-2000 period.
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4 Estimation Strategy and Effects of Recession at
Entry
4.1 Estimation Strategy
We study the effect of initial unemployment rate in the region of entry, urit, on various
labor market outcomes over time, yit, by adopting the following specification




βs1 [Expit = s]uri0
)
+ φurit + ψs + µb + λr + γl + θt + uit (1)
Along with introducing unrestricted fixed effects for year of potential experience, ψs,
we interact unemployment at entry in region r with dummies specific for each year of
potential experience. The effect of the unemployment at entry is thus allowed to be
different at each year of potential experience: βs represents the marginal effect of the
initial unemployment rate s years after entry. In order to isolate the effect of initial
labor market conditions from subsequent macroeconomic shocks possibly correlated to
initial conditions, we control for the current regional employment rate, urit. We take
into account permanent unobserved heterogeneity connected to the region of birth (µb),
to the region of entry (λr) and to the year of entry cohort (γl). Finally, θt represents a
calendar year effect.
We interpret the estimated ψs as driven by variations in labor demand conditions.
In the same way as Oreopoulos et al. (2012), our identification strategy is based on
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the assumption that (conditional on region of birth, region of entry, cohort, experience
and calendar year effects) region-cohort specific variations in unemployment rates for all
workers are not correlated to shocks at the labor supply of young workers. We implement
various robustness checks to make sure that our results are not driven by endogenous
labor market entry over the business cycle, both from the perspective of the timing
of entry and sorting into different local labor markets. Finally, we repeat the analysis
within a duration framework in order to fully exploit all the available information about
the timing of the occurrence of injuries.
4.2 Main Results
We first focus our analysis on standard labor outcomes such as log weekly wages, log
annual earnings and log annual weeks worked. We also use all observations in the period
1994-2003 to construct an index to measure the log mean wage in occupations in the same
sector. By observing the effect of ur0 on this index we can detect the effect of ur0 on
the movement of workers in occupations that receive higher or lower salaries on average.8
Figure 3 shows the effect of ur0 by year of experience on log weekly wages, the log wage
index, log annual earnings and the log of weeks worked. The detailed estimation results
are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. Panel (a) indicates that a one point increase
in the unemployment rate is associated with an increase in starting wage levels by 1.6%.
However, entrants during periods of high unemployment display lower wage growth than
workers entered with more favorable labor market conditions. Indeed, the initial premium
8Mansour (2009) adopts a similar approach but focuses on average wage of the initial occupation.
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decreases rapidly and fades away after 7 years of experience. Results in Panel (b) indicate
that workers entered during recessions are more likely to start in occupations that receive
higher compensations on average. This effect of ur0 is more persistent than the effect
on the individual wages, thus suggesting that these cohorts of workers may have lower
mobility rates out of these occupations. Panels (c) and (d) confirm the presence of a
marginal premium also in terms of annual earnings and number of weeks worked, which
become insignificant after 6 and 4 years of experience, respectively. As shown in Table
A1 in the Appendix, current unemployment rate has a small and negative effect on wages
and earnings, but not on annual weeks worked.
Figure 4 displays the pattern of the estimated effect of initial unemployment rate on
our proxies of job safety by year of potential experience. Panels (a), (b) and (c) in Figure
4 indicate a positive and significant effect of ur0 on the number injuries (per thousand of
days worked), which increases over time for all injuries and NIC injuries but remains con-
stant for IC injuries. The detailed estimation results are reported in Table A2. Compared
to the average number of injuries observed in the sample,9 the estimated effect of one
point increase in ur0 on the number of all injuries ranges from 3.5%, during the first year
of work, to 7.5%, when workers have potentially accumulated ten years of experience.
When we restrict the analysis to NIC injuries, the estimated percentage effects are lower,
but their temporal pattern increases more steeply (from 2.2% to 6.4%). The estimated
percentage losses in terms of IC injuries are instead constant in time but of a greater
magnitude (approximately 15%). The different magnitude and temporal pattern for IC
9The average number of injuries per thousand of days worked is 0.322. Distinguishing between NIC
and IC injuries, this figure is 0.296 and 0.026, respectively.
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and NIC injuries may be consistent with a reporting behavior similar to that pointed out
by Boone and van Ours (2006), Boone et al. (2011): workers beginning their career in
a relatively less/more favorable macroeconomic scenario may have a worse/better bar-
gaining position within the firm and may tend to under/over report less serious injuries.
This difference in reporting behavior may decrease as workers accumulate experience and
their bargaining positions equalize. The fact that such reporting mechanism is absent for
IC injuries could explain why we find greater percentage losses in terms of this kind of
injuries. It is also worth noting that, consistently with the original Boone and van Ours
(2006), Boone et al. (2011) argument, the effect of current unemployment rate reported
in Table A2 is negative and significant for all injuries and NIC injuries (columns 1 and
5 ) but it is not statistically significant for IC injuries (column 3): the current economic
cycle only affects less serious injuries by changing the incentives to report this kind of
injuries. Therefore, we are inclined to think that the effect of the current unemployment
rate on injuries mainly reflects the reporting behavior of workers, while the effect of ur0,
being robust to restricting the analysis to IC injuries, truly implies a lower level of job
safety.
4.3 A different measure of the risk imposed by the work envi-
ronment
In the previous paragraph, by differentiating between IC and NIC injuries, we have shown
that our results on job safety are robust to taking into account the reporting behavior
of entrants. However, the persistent effect on injuries estimated at the individual level
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might be determined by factors other than the risk imposed by the work environment
but that are otherwise connected to starting macroeconomic conditions. Indeed, a higher
unemployment rate at entry may act as a “discipline device” (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984)
inducing workers to exert greater effort and/or it might constitute a stress factor lead-
ing to a less cautious behavior. Ideally, a measure of the risk imposed by the working
environment may be constructed by using the number of workplace injuries incurred by
the colleagues of young entrant “i” in each firm, but this strategy is not feasible because
the WHIP dataset does not contain information on all workers employed at a single firm.
Therefore, at a level of greater aggregation, three injury indexes have been computed (i.e.,
one for each category of injuries: all, IC and NIC) as the sum of injuries in the 1994-2003
divided the corresponding sum of weeks worked in cells defined using occupation (blue
versus white collar), sector (ATECO 1991/ISIC rev 1.1 at two digits) and region. These
injury incidence rates have been computed using workers over 33 years old to obtain a
measure of risk totally independent of the behavior on the job of young entrants.10 The
value of the indexes calculated for older workers is then imputed to entrants belonging to
the same cell. We then use these three injury incidence rates as dependent variables to
determine the effect of ur0 on the occupation-specific risks faced by workers along their
careers. Panels (d), (e) and (f) in Figure 4 describe the estimated effect of ur0 on these
indexes by year of experience. The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained by
using individual level data: entrants in recession persistently lose in terms of job safety.
10We obtain the same results if we construct the index using all workers or only young workers
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Comparing the estimated effects to the observed averages of the indexes,11 the estimated
effect of one point increase in ur0 on the three injury incidence rates is very similar,
ranging from 1% to 2%. The lower magnitude of the estimated percentage effects with
respect to what we obtain by using individual level injuries could be explained by the ag-
gregate nature of these indexes which average across the different tasks included in a cell.
Finally, the fact that we do not find relevant differences between IC and NIC indexes is
probably also due to the aggregate nature of these proxies, which average across workers
and therefore eliminate differences in reporting behavior related to initial macroeconomic
conditions.
4.4 Survival Analysis
In this subsection the information on the exact starting day of each job spell and the
exact day of an injury is used to estimate duration models. This methodology allows us
to construct a precise measure of risk exposure, to analyze the evolution of injury hazard
rates and, by using frailty models, to take into account the role of unobserved hetero-
geneity among different cohorts of entrants. To incorporate current unemployment rate
as a time-varying covariates, employment spells have been split in year-specific records.
In our survival analysis, the dataset and log likelihood function are set to account for
interval truncations (Cleves et al., 2010), that is periods in which some workers are not
observed because they are not employed in the sectors under analysis.12 The comparison
11The average value of the index for all injuries is 10.996. Distinguishing between NIC and IC injuries,
this figure is 9.958 and 1.038, respectively.
12See Table A4 for details. In a robustness check we have assumed that the exposure to risk is zero
during periods of non employment. The time elapsed in non-employment status is thus ignored and all
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of the values of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) selects the log-logistic regression
model as the best parametric model.
The log-logistic regression model in the accelerated failure time (AFT) metric has the
following parametrization
εj = exp(−xjβ)tj
where tj is failure time and εj is distributed as a log-logistic. In this specification a
negative coefficient β accelerates failure time, that is, injuries occur earlier. We use the
same regressors of the linear specifications with the exception of experience and current
year dummies. The latter, in presence of year of entry dummies, would implicitly capture
time since entry.
In this specification we introduce frailties following a gamma distribution to control
for unobserved heterogeneity shared by workers entering in the same year. We thus deal
with unobserved heterogeneity adopting a random effect approach instead of the fixed
cohort of entry effect used in linear models. In this specification year of entry dummies
are used to define shared frailties and are not included as regressors.
Table 2 displays the estimated coefficients from the log-logistic regressions and the
hazard ratios from the Cox proportional hazards models for all, NIC and IC injuries
respectively. Columns 1, 4 and 7 show the estimates from the baseline log-logistic specifi-
cation using the following explanatory variables: initial and current unemployment rates,
region of entry and region of birth. For all and NIC injuries (columns 1 and 4) the
exponentiated coefficients of ur0 (i.e. exp(−0.046)) imply that a one percentage point
employment spells are considered as contiguous. The main results are qualitatively similar.
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increase in initial unemployment rate decreases the time up to the first injury by a factor
approximately equal to 0.96. The exponentiated coefficient of unemployment at entry
for IC injuries in Column 7 (i.e. exp(−0.089)) indicates a greater reduction in survival
time, by a factor equal to 0.91. The specifications including shared frailties in Columns
3, 6 and 9 yield larger coefficients for ur0 than the ones estimated in the baseline specifi-
cation. These coefficients imply that a percentage point increase in ur0 reduces survival
time by a factor of 0.87 and 0.86 for all (and NIC) injuries and for IC injuries, respec-
tively. Although the (log of) theta coefficients and the likelihood ratio tests show that
shared frailties are significantly different from zero, the AIC indicates that the baseline
specifications, using year of entry dummies simply as regressors, are to be preferred.
Results from the Cox proportional hazard model in Columns 3, 6 and 9 indicate a
similar story. A percentage point increase in the unemployment at entry increases the
hazard rate of all injuries and NIC injuries by 2 % (Columns 3 and 6).13 The coefficient
of ur0 in Column 9 shows that a percentage point increase in initial unemployment rates
implies a 7.3% reduction in the hazard rate of IC injuries. Interestingly for all injuries
and NIC injuries, the use of Cox proportional hazard models, although providing quali-
tatively the same effect as the log-logistic regression, is rejected by the data. Tests based
on Schoenfeld residuals indicate a violation of the proportionality assumption. In par-
ticular, the variable-by-variable tests reveal that the Schoenfeld residuals for the initial
unemployment rate, as well as year of entry dummies, vary with time. Conversely the
proportionality assumption holds for immediate care injuries indicating that unemploy-
13Figure A2 in the Appendix plots the hazard rates for all injuries estimated by using the baseline
log-logistic regression and the Cox Proportional hazard model at ur0=8 and ur0=10
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ment at entry induces a permanent shift in the hazard function. It is worth noting again
that current unemployment rate has a much smaller effect for IC than for NIC injuries.
4.5 Entry over the business cycle
The literature on wages suggests the potential endogeneity of labor market entry over
the business cycle, both from the perspective of the timing of entry and of sorting into
different local labor markets.
Potential entrants facing negative macroeconomic conditions could decide to wait for
better opportunities, either by accumulating additional years of education or staying out
of the labor force, or could be forced to anticipate the entry into the labor market if
staying in education becomes economically unviable. Although the education level of
entrants is not reported in the WHIP database, we can observe the age at entry, which
will be increasing in education and will also reflect delayed entry due to unemployment
(which is very high in the Italian context, especially in the South) or non-employment.
The results of regressing the age of entry on the regional unemployment rate, region and
time dummies is reported in the first column of Table 3. We estimate that one percentage
point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a tiny rise (of about 0.04) in
the average age of entry, which suggests that cohorts entering the labor market during
unfavorable conditions tend to be only marginally older. Although small, the effect of
the unemployment rate on the age at entry may be the results of strategic educational
choices. Actually, high unemployment may exert two opposite effects on the decision
to stay in education: a higher unemployment probability reduces the opportunity cost
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of the educational investment, but at the same time reduces the returns to education.
Assessing what is the balance between the two effects is therefore an empirical matter.
The evidence is scant for Italy. Di Pietro (2006) found a negative relationship between
regional unemployment rates and university dropout rates. However, this is on a different
outcome and for a period (1987-1998) which only partially overlaps with our study and
includes the worst recession (1992-1993) experienced in Italy before the current one.
Closer to our study are the results of Carmeci and Chies (2006), who focus on the decision
of further education at the end of compulsory education for the period 1993-1999. They
find that the level of unemployment rates do influence negatively the decision to invest
in further education, but the annual variation in unemployment has a negligible effect.
Exploiting pooled data from the Italian Labour Force Survey, we tested the correlation
between unemployment and educational choices for our specific sample and time frame.
In the second and third column of Table 3, we report the results of logistic regressions
in which the probability of being a high school and university student is modeled as a
function of the regional unemployment rate, also conditioning on age, region and year
dummies. Closer to Carmeci and Chies (2006) results, neither the probability of attending
high school nor that of being a university student is found to be affected by the current
economic cycle. This suggests that the slightly higher age of entrants detected during
economic contractions should be imputed to episodes of unemployment/non-employment
before entry rather than to further accumulation of human capital.14
Mobility of entrants across regional labor markets could be endogenous with respect to
14Adding age at entry dummies to the specification (1) leaves the results unaltered. Results are
available upon request.
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the local business cycle. As shown in Table 4, this threat to identification is more relevant
for entrants born in the South of Italy, where 27% of entrants start working in a region
different from the region of birth. The message of these descriptive statistics is confirmed
by using a logistic regression to model a dichotomous variable for entering the labor
market in a region different from the region of birth as a function of the unemployment
rate of the region of birth in the year of entry and year dummies. Indeed, as shown in the
fourth column of Table 3, for a one point increase in the unemployment rate in the region
of birth, the odds of entering in a region different from the region of birth increases
approximately by a factor of 1.11. However, as shown in the fifth column of Table 3,
once we introduce region of birth dummies, the economic cycle in the region of birth
loses both statistical and economic significance. These results suggest that in our sample
immigration decisions are related to permanent differences in job opportunities between
regions, but they are not determined by the regional business cycle. Nevertheless, we also
replicated the baseline analyses to check the robustness of our results, by: 1) excluding
entrants in regions different from the region of birth (see Table A5 in the Appendix); 2)
using all the possible interactions between the region of entry dummies and the region
of birth dummies as controls (see Table A6 in the Appendix); 3) running regressions
separately for entrants born in the North-Center regions and for those born in the South
of Italy (see Tables A7 and A8 in the Appendix, respectively). All these robustness checks
confirm the basic findings obtained in the baseline regressions.15
15We have also tried to instrument the initial unemployment rate with the unemployment rate at
the end of compulsory schooling (14 y.o.) in the place of birth. The results, which are available upon
request, are qualitatively similar. However, as argued by Brunner and Kuhn (2014), it is very unlikely
that this kind of instrument does not have a direct effect on our dependent variables. Indeed, we have
found evidence that, after controlling for the entry unemployment rate, unemployment rate at the end
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4.6 Discussion
This section concentrates on the characteristics of jobs and firms observed along the
careers of young entrants in order to investigate the mechanisms behind the persistent
reduction in workplace safety and the lower wage growth estimated for entrants during
unfavorable macroeconomic conditions.
The relationship between initial labor market conditions and the type of occupations
and firms is analyzed using the same specification of equation (1). Estimates in Table 5
indicate that entrants during recession have a constantly higher probability of working
in a blue collar occupation (Column 1) and a lower probability of working in the more
sheltered apprentice position (Column 2). Moreover, unfavorable starting conditions
negatively affects the probability of being a white collar, but only in the medium-long
run (Column 3). The estimates reported in the last two columns of Table 5 indicate that
there are no differences driven by initial conditions in firms’ characteristics (age and size).
When we introduce initial firm attributes (sector, firm size, firm age) and type of
occupation as additional controls in the main regressions, the estimated effects of the
initial unemployment rate on labor market outcomes are not affected (see Table A9
in the Appendix). Moreover, results are not even altered by the inclusion of initial
firm’s employees growth in previous years (not shown), thus suggesting that the cyclical
variation in the job-quality is not driven by different kinds of firms recruiting in different
stages of the cycle. Similarly, changes in standard contractual arrangements seem not to
explain cyclical variation in the job-quality. Indeed, the introduction of initial contractual
of compulsory schooling increases the age of entry, and therefore it seems to have also a direct effect on
entrants’ outcomes.
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code dummies as additional controls does not either affect the main results (not shown),
thus confirming that formal contractual arrangements hide a considerable heterogeneity
in job quality which, without the injury data, would not have been detected.
Though the nature of the data does not allow us to use firms’ fixed effects to control for
employers’ unobserved heterogeneity,16 the above evidence tends to exclude an explana-
tion based on compositional effects based on firm selection. We have further investigated
the impact of unemployment at entry on the entire wage distribution to detect possible
effects due to selection based on firms’ or workers’ unobserved characteristics. Figure 5
displays the effect of ur0 on the percentiles of the log wage distribution in the year of
entry and in the third, sixth and ninth years of experience. The black lines represent
the estimated effects using only the regressors of the baseline specification and show that
the initial wage premium is distributed along the entire distribution. A similar pattern is
followed by the red lines that plot the estimated effect of ur0 when the regression includes
additional controls for initial firm attributes (sector, average number of employees, age)
and type of occupation. These results suggest that, even controlling for the characteris-
tics of the first job and firm, the effects of ur0 are not concentrated in specific parts of
the distribution and therefore they are probably not driven by the increased or decreased
participation of selected groups of workers and/or employers.
Workers’ mobility may help explain what drives the increase in injuries and whether
such dynamics are consistent with existing theoretical models. By investigating the effect
16A large share of the observations would drop out of the analysis as many firms are observed only in
association to the same worker. Also remember that we cannot use workers’ fixed effects because our
main regressor, the initial unemployment rate, is time invariant.
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of initial unemployment rate on workers’ mobility we can verify whether entrants during
recessions search more intensively (consistent with job-search models), accumulate lower
experience or tenure. Table 6 uses the data from the second year of potential experience
onward17 and the same specification of equation (1) to study how the initial conditions
affects the probability of being in a firm different from the entry firm (Column 1), the
probability of being in a firm different from that of the previous year (Column 2), firm
tenure (Column 3) and the probability of being non-employed.18 In sharp contrast with
the evidence for less rigid labor markets where between firm mobility is a key ingredient
for the catch-up process especially in the short-medium run (see for example Oreopoulos
et al., 2012), entrants during recession do not exhibit an higher probability to leave
the initial firm and are marginally more mobile only in the long run (see columns 1
and 2). Indeed estimates in column 3 display a very tiny negative effects on tenure
(lower for entrants in recessions) only in the long run. Column 4 shows that entrants
during recession have a lower probability to be non-employed. This higher attachment
to the labor market, coupled with the estimated initial wage premium,19 goes against
an explanation of the losses based on the lower productivity of workers entering during
recession.
Given that we do not detect lower accumulation of tenure or experience for entrants
during recessions, our findings could at least in part be rationalized with the human capi-
17During the year of entry the analyzed outcomes are the same for all workers.
18Given the nature of the data, the non-employment status may hide a transition to open ended jobs in
the public administration, which is not covered by INPS administrative archives (while temporary work
is observed). However, for a young blue collar male, the probability of directly entering as a permanent
worker in Italian Public Administration is negligible in those years.
19Lower unobserved skills of workers selected in risky jobs has constituted a major obstacle in the
estimation of positive wage premium for risk.
25
tal mechanism proposed by Gibbons and Waldman (2006) which suggests that if entrants
are assigned to low-quality tasks during recessions, initial conditions may have persistent
effects by decreasing workers productivity. Moreover, as suggested by Oreopoulos et al.
(2012), the recovery from unfavorable initial conditions may be hampered by the accu-
mulation of specific human capital, which increases the opportunity cost to change job.
In the Italian context these mechanisms may be reinforced, because for labor market en-
trants accumulating specific human capital may also constitute an investment to become
insiders. This could explain why, unlike what is observed for other countries, entrants
during unfavorable labor market conditions do not display a higher search intensity and
do not catch-up as time passes by. With respect to labor markets characterized by less
rigid institutional settings, their incentives to search for ”better” jobs may be compar-
atively lower. This interpretation is also supported by the results of Table A10, where
the effects of experience and of the initial conditions are allowed to vary for employees
working in a firm different from the entry firm.20 We find that movers have lower wage
growth and a lower decrease of injuries with experience. The worst evolution of movers’
careers could be at least in part explained by lay-offs of less productive workers. Nev-
ertheless, further considering that the estimated effect of initial labor market conditions
is the same for movers and for stayers (see Figure A4), our findings indicate that on
average changes of employer are not associated to better labor market outcomes neither
for workers starting with unfavorable conditions. To account for these patterns alone,
job-search models and human capital models should feature prohibitive mobility costs
20We add the interactions of these variables with an indicator variable for working in a firm different
from the initial firm.
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and/or no benefits associated with job search.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides evidence on the effect of unemployment at entry on the subsequent
injury hazard rates of male workers who entered the Italian labor market in 1994-2003. We
interpret the permanent worsening in workplace safety and the temporary wage premium
as indicative of more time spent by these cohorts in low quality jobs.
The presence of labor market rigidities and the insider-outsider dualism can amplify
the negative effect of unfavorable entry conditions on the allocation and persistence of
young workers in low quality jobs. The observed pattern in the reporting of less severe
injuries seem to confirm that entrants may be willing to pay a price to enter during reces-
sion and may consider it as an investment to become a future insider. Such an investment,
may imply a prolonged accumulation of low quality task-specific human capital (Gibbons
and Waldman, 2006) which may harm worker productivity.
Our paper conveys an important message for rigid labor markets. A centralized wage
setting system can certainly reduce differences in monetary remunerations among different
cohorts of workers. However, it cannot prevent adjustments in other job characteristics,
especially if the latter amenities are not easily measured and are less subject to bargaining
and monitoring. Employers may thus overcome labor market rigidities by varying the
composition and the quality of the jobs offered. This change in the mix of hazardous
task may represent an important mechanism to enhance flexibility at entry in the labor
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market.
Our findings thus claim that the entire set of job characteristics should be considered
by policy-makers when evaluating the effect of macroeconomic shocks. More attention
should also be devoted to institutional rigidities which may considerably affect the dimen-
sions along which recessions reduce job quality and create long-lasting disparities among
cohorts of workers.
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Figure 1: National and regional unemployment rates, 1994-2003.
Source ISTAT.
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Figure 2: Residual unemployment rates, 1994-2003.
The lines represent the region-specific residuals from a regression of regional unemployment rate on
year and region dummies.
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Figure 3: Effect of ur0 on log wages, wage index, log annual earnings and log weeks
worked
(a) Log weekly wages (b) Log wage index
(c) Log annual earnings (d) Log annual weeks worked





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: The effect of labor market conditions on the age at entry, the probability of being
a high school student, the probability of being a university student and the probability
of starting working in a region different from the region of birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)










region fixed effect yes yes yes no yes
year fixed effect yes yes yes no yes
N 80331 143009 196150 80331 80331
R2 0.082
Note: The results of column 1 are based on a OLS regression, all the other columns report the results
of logistic regressions. ur0 refers to the unemployment rate of the region of entry in the year of entry;
urN is the unemployment rate of the region of birth in the year of entry; urt is the contemporaneous
unemployment rate in the region of residence. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by
region of entry per year of entry. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,* significant at 10%.
Table 4: Distribution of entrants by macro-region of birth and macro-region of entry
Region of birth % of entrants in region % of entr. in North % of entr. in Center % of entr. in South
different from reg. of birth and Islands
North 7.6 96.4 2.2 1.4
Center 8.4 3.0 94.8 2.2
South and Isl. 27.0 12.6 11.5 75.9
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Table 5: The effect on initial and contemporaneous labor market conditions on job and
firm characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Apprentice Blue collar White collar Aver. numb. of employees Year of firm birth
ψ1 -0.0103 -0.0072 0.0180
∗∗∗ -491.1111∗∗∗ -0.6851∗∗∗
(0.0103) (0.0096) (0.0057) (122.0646) (0.1772)
ψ2 -0.0598
∗∗∗ 0.0140 0.0467∗∗∗ -652.4799∗∗∗ -1.2554∗∗∗
(0.0203) (0.0185) (0.0114) (212.3137) (0.3439)
ψ3 -0.1767
∗∗∗ 0.0950∗∗∗ 0.0830∗∗∗ -627.2470∗∗ -1.8567∗∗∗
(0.0294) (0.0272) (0.0165) (282.5111) (0.4954)
ψ4 -0.2939
∗∗∗ 0.1788∗∗∗ 0.1165∗∗∗ -601.0239 -2.3321∗∗∗
(0.0392) (0.0368) (0.0217) (368.5376) (0.6595)
ψ5 -0.3787
∗∗∗ 0.2430∗∗∗ 0.1366∗∗∗ -636.5541 -2.9501∗∗∗
(0.0479) (0.0449) (0.0273) (458.9337) (0.8189)
ψ6 -0.4311
∗∗∗ 0.2686∗∗∗ 0.1636∗∗∗ -689.9521 -3.7899∗∗∗
(0.0572) (0.0535) (0.0322) (546.7727) (0.9621)
ψ7 -0.4765
∗∗∗ 0.3051∗∗∗ 0.1712∗∗∗ -627.2085 -4.1091∗∗∗
(0.0664) (0.0621) (0.0383) (653.4127) (1.1817)
ψ8 -0.5166
∗∗∗ 0.3273∗∗∗ 0.1880∗∗∗ -561.3404 -4.3434∗∗∗
(0.0800) (0.0725) (0.0443) (758.3805) (1.3470)
ψ9 -0.5382
∗∗∗ 0.3158∗∗∗ 0.2187∗∗∗ -371.1938 -4.6681∗∗∗
(0.1060) (0.0805) (0.0575) (824.4677) (1.5256)
β0 -0.0212
∗∗∗ 0.0211∗∗∗ 0.0001 -20.2449 -0.0274
(0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0013) (32.8142) (0.0507)
β1 -0.0205
∗∗∗ 0.0207∗∗∗ -0.0002 12.9736 -0.0277
(0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0013) (32.9913) (0.0500)
β2 -0.0196
∗∗∗ 0.0208∗∗∗ -0.0011 28.8675 -0.0379
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0013) (32.5239) (0.0499)
β3 -0.0164
∗∗∗ 0.0189∗∗∗ -0.0024∗ 34.4513 -0.0266
(0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0014) (33.0310) (0.0488)
β4 -0.0131
∗∗∗ 0.0173∗∗∗ -0.0040∗∗∗ 41.4381 -0.0217
(0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0014) (32.3806) (0.0506)
β5 -0.0108
∗∗∗ 0.0157∗∗∗ -0.0047∗∗∗ 46.3484 -0.0046
(0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0014) (35.2471) (0.0524)
β6 -0.0093
∗∗∗ 0.0157∗∗∗ -0.0063∗∗∗ 54.0599 0.0389
(0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0015) (35.9684) (0.0515)
β7 -0.0078
∗∗ 0.0140∗∗∗ -0.0060∗∗∗ 47.0341 0.0342
(0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0015) (36.3415) (0.0546)
β8 -0.0070
∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗ -0.0065∗∗∗ 50.8119 0.0302
(0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0015) (34.7873) (0.0576)
β9 -0.0073
∗ 0.0163∗∗∗ -0.0085∗∗∗ 58.9073 0.0384
(0.0039) (0.0029) (0.0023) (37.2060) (0.0667)
φ -0.0006 -0.0014 0.0020∗∗∗ -40.4455∗∗∗ 0.1726∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0005) (12.1242) (0.0221)
N 362682 362682 362682 345849 346105
R2 0.125 0.069 0.034 0.013 0.056
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by region of entry per year of entry. ***
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,* significant at 10%. Regressions include dummies for year of
entry, region of entry, region of birth and current year. See equation 1 for the interpretation of φ, β and
ψ coefficients.
Figure 5: Effect of ur0 on log wage distribution
Note: The solid lines represent the effect of ur0 on the percentiles of the log wage distribution by year
of experience. All regressions include dummies for year of entry, region of entry, region of birth and
current year. The black line represents the estimated effect of ur0 in the baseline specification. The red
line represents the estimated effect of ur0 after the inclusion of additional controls such as initial firm
attributes (sector, average number of employees, age) and type of occupation. The grey area and the
dotted lines show the 95% confidence intervals.
Table 6: The effect of initial and contemporaneous labor market conditions on the prob-
ability of working in the entry firm, the probability of changing firm, tenure and the
probability of being non-employed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entry firm Change firm Tenure Non-Employed
ψ2 -0.2107
∗∗∗ 0.0611∗∗∗ 0.4812∗∗∗ 0.0000
(0.0161) (0.0060) (0.0199) (0.0065)
ψ3 -0.2631
∗∗∗ -0.0081 0.9921∗∗∗ -0.0255∗∗
(0.0202) (0.0097) (0.0409) (0.0120)
ψ4 -0.2746
∗∗∗ -0.0494∗∗∗ 1.5302∗∗∗ -0.0338∗∗
(0.0202) (0.0132) (0.0623) (0.0168)
ψ5 -0.2532
∗∗∗ -0.0897∗∗∗ 2.0817∗∗∗ -0.0307
(0.0247) (0.0162) (0.0770) (0.0226)
ψ6 -0.2646
∗∗∗ -0.1120∗∗∗ 2.6116∗∗∗ -0.0250
(0.0234) (0.0193) (0.1012) (0.0284)
ψ7 -0.2526
∗∗∗ -0.1200∗∗∗ 3.0923∗∗∗ -0.0188
(0.0367) (0.0238) (0.1297) (0.0343)
ψ8 -0.2472
∗∗∗ -0.1409∗∗∗ 3.6124∗∗∗ -0.0004
(0.0333) (0.0278) (0.1471) (0.0389)
ψ9 -0.2127
∗∗∗ -0.1570∗∗∗ 4.2220∗∗∗ 0.0032
(0.0333) (0.0388) (0.2066) (0.0389)
β1 0.0011 -0.0059
∗∗∗ 0.0093 -0.0303∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0014) (0.0085) (0.0025)
β2 0.0003 -0.0046
∗∗∗ 0.0173∗∗ -0.0240∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0014) (0.0082) (0.0024)
β3 -0.0016 -0.0003 0.0153
∗ -0.0210∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0015) (0.0083) (0.0025)
β4 -0.0021 0.0015 0.0094 -0.0200
∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0015) (0.0088) (0.0026)
β5 -0.0037 0.0031
∗∗ -0.0014 -0.0200∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0015) (0.0084) (0.0027)
β6 -0.0034 0.0037
∗∗ -0.0113 -0.0209∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0016) (0.0088) (0.0028)
β7 -0.0030 0.0022 -0.0141 -0.0210
∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0017) (0.0100) (0.0028)
β8 -0.0030 0.0029
∗ -0.0221∗ -0.0227∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0017) (0.0114) (0.0027)
β9 -0.0034 0.0034
∗∗ -0.0369∗∗∗ -0.0227∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0017) (0.0133) (0.0029)
φ 0.0039∗∗ -0.0040∗∗ 0.0296∗∗∗ 0.0347∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0104) (0.0025)
N 282351 282351 282351 373847
R2 0.196 0.017 0.253 0.075
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by region of entry per year of entry. ***
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,* significant at 10%. Regressions include dummies for year of
entry, region of entry, region of birth and current year. See equation 1 for the interpretation of φ, β and
ψ coefficients.
A Appendix
Figure A1: Log mean wage by year of experience for different cohorts of entrants
This figure shows the mean log wages by year of experience for cohorts or workers entered in different
years. The bottom green line represents mean log wage in the year of entry.
Figure A2: Estimated hazards by log-logistic and Cox proportional hazard model, all
injuries
Figure A3: Mean log entry wages, ECHP
Source: Authors’ computation from ECHP data. This figure shows the mean log wages in the year of
entry for different cohorts in the period 1994-2000. The sample includes entrants who respect the
selection criteria described in the data section. The weekly wages are computed dividing the real gross
monthly salary earnings by the notional number of weeks in a month. The weekly wages are reported
on a full time equivalent scale using the information about the amount of hours worked in a week.
Figure A4: Effect of ur0 on weekly wages and individual level injuries for stayers in the
entry firm and movers
(a) Log weekly wages (b) All injuries
(c) NIC injuries (d) IC injuries
Note: The grey area and the dotted lines represent the 95% confidence intervals for stayers and movers,
respectively. Stayers are individuals who remain with the first employer. Movers are individuals who
move out from the first employer. Robust standard errors are clustered by region of entry per year of
entry. Regressions include dummies for year of entry, region of entry, region of birth and current year.
Table A1: The effect of initial and contemporaneous labor market conditions on log
weekly wage, weekly wage index, annual earnings, annual weeks worked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(wage) ln(wage index) ln(earnings) ln(weeks worked)
ψ1 0.106*** 0.005 0.860*** 0.754***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.016) (0.012)
ψ2 0.222*** 0.030*** 1.038*** 0.816***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.027) (0.018)
ψ3 0.316*** 0.080*** 1.256*** 0.939***
(0.018) (0.014) (0.039) (0.026)
ψ4 0.401*** 0.131*** 1.409*** 1.008***
(0.024) (0.019) (0.053) (0.036)
ψ5 0.468*** 0.170*** 1.558*** 1.090***
(0.029) (0.023) (0.066) (0.044)
ψ6 0.536*** 0.196*** 1.687*** 1.152***
(0.035) (0.028) (0.081) (0.053)
ψ7 0.592*** 0.217*** 1.761*** 1.169***
(0.039) (0.033) (0.091) (0.059)
ψ8 0.644*** 0.239*** 1.824*** 1.180***
(0.046) (0.039) (0.106) (0.068)
ψ9 0.697*** 0.252*** 1.863*** 1.167***
(0.055) (0.047) (0.122) (0.074)
β0 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.033*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
β1 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.025*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
β2 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.024*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003)
β3 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.006*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
β4 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
β5 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009* 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
β6 0.006** 0.007*** 0.005 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
β7 0.004* 0.006*** 0.005 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
β8 0.003 0.006** 0.005 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
β9 0.002 0.006** 0.005 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
φ -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
N 362682 362682 362682 362682
R2 0.163 0.159 0.290 0.236
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,* significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by region of entry per year of entry. Regressions include dummies for year of
entry, region of entry, region of birth and current year. See equation 1 for the interpretation of φ, β and
ψ coefficients.
Table A2: The effect of initial and contemporaneous labor market conditions on individual
level injuries and injury incidence rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All injuries injury incidence rate IC injuries injury incidence rate NIC injuries injury incidence rate
(All injuries) (IC injuries) (NIC injuries)
ψ1 -0.0481* -0.1493* -0.0210** 0.0264** -0.0271 -0.1757**
(0.0256) (0.0873) (0.0100) (0.0121) (0.0240) (0.0776)
ψ2 -0.0722*** -0.4190** -0.0174 0.0217 -0.0548** -0.4406***
(0.0271) (0.1721) (0.0108) (0.0218) (0.0242) (0.1540)
ψ3 -0.1112*** -0.8575*** -0.0219 -0.0210 -0.0893** -0.8366***
(0.0397) (0.2470) (0.0133) (0.0311) (0.0352) (0.2213)
ψ4 -0.1682*** -1.2912*** -0.0491*** -0.0667* -0.1191*** -1.2246***
(0.0459) (0.3263) (0.0151) (0.0402) (0.0411) (0.2928)
ψ5 -0.1808*** -1.6352*** -0.0507*** -0.1018** -0.1301*** -1.5334***
(0.0540) (0.4126) (0.0180) (0.0508) (0.0474) (0.3701)
ψ6 -0.1938*** -1.9416*** -0.0613*** -0.1370** -0.1325** -1.8046***
(0.0605) (0.4785) (0.0207) (0.0588) (0.0522) (0.4293)
ψ7 -0.1996*** -2.0381*** -0.0661*** -0.1525** -0.1335** -1.8855***
(0.0728) (0.5532) (0.0230) (0.0695) (0.0645) (0.4947)
ψ8 -0.2434*** -2.2935*** -0.0721*** -0.1834** -0.1713** -2.1101***
(0.0799) (0.6209) (0.0265) (0.0805) (0.0699) (0.5544)
ψ9 -0.2514*** -2.7056*** -0.0857*** -0.2239** -0.1657** -2.4817***
(0.0906) (0.7722) (0.0253) (0.0933) (0.0821) (0.6907)
β0 0.0112*** 0.1119*** 0.0047*** 0.0124*** 0.0065* 0.0996***
(0.0032) (0.0251) (0.0016) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0225)
β1 0.0123*** 0.1215*** 0.0048*** 0.0113*** 0.0075** 0.1102***
(0.0029) (0.0250) (0.0014) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0223)
β2 0.0120*** 0.1326*** 0.0035*** 0.0115*** 0.0085*** 0.1211***
(0.0027) (0.0254) (0.0013) (0.0035) (0.0029) (0.0225)
β3 0.0154*** 0.1524*** 0.0034** 0.0139*** 0.0121*** 0.1386***
(0.0029) (0.0263) (0.0014) (0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0233)
β4 0.0186*** 0.1745*** 0.0048*** 0.0164*** 0.0138*** 0.1580***
(0.0031) (0.0273) (0.0014) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0243)
β5 0.0214*** 0.1919*** 0.0044*** 0.0185*** 0.0170*** 0.1733***
(0.0034) (0.0295) (0.0014) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0264)
β6 0.0224*** 0.2032*** 0.0048*** 0.0198*** 0.0176*** 0.1834***
(0.0035) (0.0290) (0.0016) (0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0259)
β7 0.0193*** 0.1980*** 0.0042*** 0.0199*** 0.0151*** 0.1781***
(0.0040) (0.0298) (0.0015) (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0263)
β8 0.0233*** 0.1992*** 0.0045*** 0.0198*** 0.0188*** 0.1794***
(0.0034) (0.0316) (0.0016) (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0281)
β9 0.0241*** 0.2300*** 0.0052*** 0.0229*** 0.0189*** 0.2070***
(0.0058) (0.0481) (0.0019) (0.0062) (0.0055) (0.0425)
φ -0.0166*** -0.2823*** -0.0006 -0.0044*** -0.0160*** -0.2780***
(0.0018) (0.0155) (0.0004) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0141)
N 362682 349379 362682 349379 362682 349379
R2 0.003 0.146 0.000 0.083 0.003 0.157
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,* significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by region of entry per year of entry. Regressions include dummies for year of
entry, region of entry, region of birth and current year. See equation 1 for the interpretation of φ, β and ψ
coefficients. The dependent variables are the number of injuries per thousand of days worked. IC stands
for immediate care, indicating injuries which require immediate cares. NIC stands for non-immediate
care.
A.1 Structure of the dataset
Table A3: Structure of the dataset
individuals Working spell year injury t0 t1 initial current
spell start spell stop unemployment unemployment
[..] [..] [..] [..] [..] [..] [..] [..] [..]
881 14137 14244 1998 0 0 107 5.8 5.8
881 14244 14609 1999 0 107 472 5.8 4.7
881 14609 14975 2000 0 472 838 5.8 4.4
881 14975 15340 2001 0 838 1203 5.8 3.7
881 15340 15705 2002 0 1203 1568 5.8 3.8
881 15705 16070 2003 0 1568 1933 5.8 3.6
[..] [..] [..] [..] [..] [..] [..] [..] [..]
1808 13163 13514 1996 0 0 351 6.2 6.2
1808 13514 13879 1997 0 351 716 6.2 5.9
1808 13879 14106 1998 0 716 943 6.2 5.8
1808 14167 14244 1998 0 1004 1081 6.2 5
1808 14244 14593 1999 0 1081 1430 6.2 4.7
1808 14868 14873 2000 1 1705 1710 6.2 3.7
[..] [..] [..] [..] [..] [..] [..] [..] [..]
Table A4: Loglikelihood contributions
Individual Record Year Censoring Survival Entry Time Var. Contribution to the
Indicator Time Time Covariates log likelihood
Multiple data records after episode splitting in year specific records and interval truncation
3 1 1994 0 t1 0 ur1994 log(S(t1))
3 2 1995 0 t3 t2 ur1995 log(S(t3)/S(t2))
3 3 [..] [..] [..] [..] [..] [..]
4 1 1994 0 t1 0 ur1994 log(S(t1))
4 2 1995 1 t3 t2 ur1995 log(f(t3)/S(t2))
Multiple data records after episode splitting in year specific records and no interval truncation
1 1 1994 0 t1 0 ur1994 log(S(t1))
1 2 1995 0 t2 t1 ur1995 log(S(t2)/S(t1))
1 3 [..] [..] [..] [..] [..] [..]
2 1 1994 0 t1 0 ur1994 log(S(t1))
2 2 1995 1 t2 t1 ur1995 log(f(t2)/S(t1))
A.2 Log likelihood specification
A.2.1 Episode splitting and interval truncation
In our preferred specification we use a loglogistic hazard function. As shown in Table A3
we have split the episodes in year-specific records to incorporate time-varying covariates.
The contribution of each record to the loglikelihood function for individual i is as follows:
LogLi = ci log[θ(Ti)] + log[S(Ti)]
where ci = 1 if the spell ends with an injury and 0 if the individual i is censored.
θ(Ti) is the hazard rate and is equal to f(Ti)/S(Ti). Given the structure of our dataset
we consider the individuals to be at risk of injury only during episodes of employment.
Since some individuals experience periods of unemployment, we have interval truncation.
More precisely, we observe each worker at the time of first entry; thus, we know the spell
start date and the time at which the individual is first at risk. However, if a spell of
unemployment occurs, we observe subsequent year specific records with delayed entry.
For example, if individual i is employed for t1 days in his first job but experiences
unemployment between t1 and t2, the hazard function and survivor function computed
at the first year-specific record at reemployment should be conditional on the survival
function computed at time t2.
Table A4 summarizes the contributions to the log-likelihood of each year-specific
record for individuals, censored and not censored, with and without interval truncations.
Table A5: The effect of initial and contemporaneous labor market conditions on weekly
wage and individual level injuries: Excluding entrants in a region different from the region
of birth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(wage) All injuries IC injuries NIC injuries
ψ1 0.1136
∗∗∗ -0.0744∗∗∗ -0.0270∗∗ -0.0474∗
(0.0084) (0.0268) (0.0111) (0.0242)
ψ2 0.2330
∗∗∗ -0.0830∗∗∗ -0.0230∗∗ -0.0600∗∗
(0.0133) (0.0290) (0.0114) (0.0255)
ψ3 0.3348
∗∗∗ -0.1226∗∗∗ -0.0288∗∗ -0.0939∗∗∗
(0.0191) (0.0401) (0.0144) (0.0345)
ψ4 0.4226
∗∗∗ -0.1641∗∗∗ -0.0560∗∗∗ -0.1081∗∗∗
(0.0249) (0.0437) (0.0166) (0.0389)
ψ5 0.4897
∗∗∗ -0.1725∗∗∗ -0.0566∗∗∗ -0.1159∗∗
(0.0304) (0.0545) (0.0193) (0.0474)
ψ6 0.5585
∗∗∗ -0.1871∗∗∗ -0.0672∗∗∗ -0.1198∗∗
(0.0373) (0.0621) (0.0227) (0.0541)
ψ7 0.6152
∗∗∗ -0.1830∗∗ -0.0704∗∗∗ -0.1126∗
(0.0422) (0.0723) (0.0250) (0.0629)
ψ8 0.6716
∗∗∗ -0.2424∗∗∗ -0.0779∗∗∗ -0.1646∗∗
(0.0494) (0.0810) (0.0282) (0.0702)
ψ9 0.7175
∗∗∗ -0.2585∗∗∗ -0.0959∗∗∗ -0.1626∗
(0.0573) (0.0932) (0.0271) (0.0834)
β0 0.0174
∗∗∗ 0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗ 0.0077∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0034) (0.0016) (0.0038)
β1 0.0160
∗∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0099∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0015) (0.0037)
β2 0.0144
∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0014) (0.0032)
β3 0.0122
∗∗∗ 0.0175∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0033)
β4 0.0102
∗∗∗ 0.0190∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0142∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0014) (0.0037)
β5 0.0088
∗∗∗ 0.0227∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0185∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0037) (0.0015) (0.0040)
β6 0.0063
∗∗ 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0190∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0039) (0.0016) (0.0040)
β7 0.0049
∗ 0.0203∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0042) (0.0015) (0.0042)
β8 0.0037 0.0253
∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗ 0.0210∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0037) (0.0017) (0.0040)
β9 0.0030 0.0264
∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0211∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0065) (0.0019) (0.0063)
φ -0.0077∗∗∗ -0.0194∗∗∗ -0.0006 -0.0188∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0025) (0.0006) (0.0024)
N 313697 313697 313697 313697
R2 0.172 0.002 0.000 0.002
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by region of entry per year of entry. Regressions
include dummies for year of entry, region of entry, region of birth and current year. See equation 1 for
the interpretation of φ, β and ψ coefficients. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,* significant at
10%.
Table A6: The effect of initial and contemporaneous labor market conditions on weekly
wage and individual level injuries using as additional controls all the possible interactions
between region of entry dummies and region of birth dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(wage) All injuries IC injuries NIC injuries
ψ1 0.1070
∗∗∗ -0.0477∗ -0.0209∗∗ -0.0268
(0.0077) (0.0256) (0.0100) (0.0240)
ψ2 0.2229
∗∗∗ -0.0709∗∗∗ -0.0171 -0.0539∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0271) (0.0108) (0.0241)
ψ3 0.3182
∗∗∗ -0.1084∗∗∗ -0.0215 -0.0869∗∗
(0.0180) (0.0403) (0.0134) (0.0355)
ψ4 0.4042
∗∗∗ -0.1646∗∗∗ -0.0484∗∗∗ -0.1162∗∗∗
(0.0238) (0.0462) (0.0152) (0.0413)
ψ5 0.4720
∗∗∗ -0.1754∗∗∗ -0.0497∗∗∗ -0.1257∗∗∗
(0.0291) (0.0548) (0.0182) (0.0480)
ψ6 0.5396
∗∗∗ -0.1873∗∗∗ -0.0600∗∗∗ -0.1273∗∗
(0.0358) (0.0608) (0.0211) (0.0521)
ψ7 0.5962
∗∗∗ -0.1927∗∗∗ -0.0645∗∗∗ -0.1282∗∗
(0.0398) (0.0729) (0.0234) (0.0642)
ψ8 0.6487
∗∗∗ -0.2353∗∗∗ -0.0702∗∗∗ -0.1651∗∗
(0.0468) (0.0802) (0.0269) (0.0698)
ψ9 0.7017
∗∗∗ -0.2425∗∗∗ -0.0834∗∗∗ -0.1591∗
(0.0557) (0.0900) (0.0258) (0.0812)
β0 0.0154
∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0066∗
(0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0016) (0.0034)
β1 0.0144
∗∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0077∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0034)
β2 0.0129
∗∗∗ 0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0013) (0.0030)
β3 0.0112
∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗ 0.0122∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0014) (0.0031)
β4 0.0093
∗∗∗ 0.0187∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0014) (0.0035)
β5 0.0078
∗∗∗ 0.0214∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0170∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0034) (0.0014) (0.0037)
β6 0.0056
∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0177∗∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0016) (0.0036)
β7 0.0042
∗ 0.0194∗∗∗ 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0040) (0.0015) (0.0040)
β8 0.0034 0.0234
∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.0190∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0016) (0.0037)
β9 0.0022 0.0243
∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0192∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0058) (0.0018) (0.0056)
φ -0.0078∗∗∗ -0.0163∗∗∗ -0.0006 -0.0157∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0018) (0.0004) (0.0018)
N 362682 362682 362682 362682
R2 0.167 0.004 0.001 0.004
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by region of entry per year of entry. Regressions
include dummies for year of entry, region of entry, region of birth, current year and all the possible
interactions between region of entry dummies and region of birth dummies. See equation 1 for the
interpretation of φ, β and ψ coefficients. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,* significant at 10%.
Table A7: The effect of initial and contemporaneous labor market conditions on weekly
wage and individual level injuries: Including only entrants born in the North-Center
regions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(wage) All injuries IC injuries NIC injuries
ψ1 0.0997
∗∗∗ -0.0408 -0.0146 -0.0262
(0.0086) (0.0408) (0.0128) (0.0380)
ψ2 0.2227
∗∗∗ -0.0708∗ -0.0263∗∗ -0.0444
(0.0141) (0.0419) (0.0131) (0.0396)
ψ3 0.3216
∗∗∗ -0.1358∗∗∗ -0.0304∗ -0.1054∗∗
(0.0186) (0.0519) (0.0160) (0.0496)
ψ4 0.4125
∗∗∗ -0.2085∗∗∗ -0.0597∗∗∗ -0.1489∗∗∗
(0.0242) (0.0580) (0.0167) (0.0556)
ψ5 0.4839
∗∗∗ -0.2082∗∗∗ -0.0735∗∗∗ -0.1347∗∗
(0.0292) (0.0635) (0.0208) (0.0582)
ψ6 0.5461
∗∗∗ -0.2874∗∗∗ -0.0801∗∗∗ -0.2073∗∗
(0.0343) (0.0837) (0.0238) (0.0809)
ψ7 0.6137
∗∗∗ -0.2368∗∗∗ -0.0807∗∗∗ -0.1561∗
(0.0394) (0.0887) (0.0256) (0.0853)
ψ8 0.6579
∗∗∗ -0.3584∗∗∗ -0.1169∗∗∗ -0.2415∗∗
(0.0475) (0.1029) (0.0298) (0.0956)
ψ9 0.7054
∗∗∗ -0.2806∗∗ -0.1173∗∗∗ -0.1634
(0.0585) (0.1199) (0.0306) (0.1147)
β0 0.0101
∗∗∗ -0.0006 0.0052∗∗ -0.0058
(0.0031) (0.0109) (0.0023) (0.0103)
β1 0.0104
∗∗∗ -0.0038 0.0033∗∗ -0.0071
(0.0032) (0.0091) (0.0016) (0.0087)
β2 0.0079
∗∗ -0.0016 0.0041∗∗ -0.0057
(0.0031) (0.0097) (0.0018) (0.0092)
β3 0.0056
∗ 0.0051 0.0031∗ 0.0020
(0.0030) (0.0104) (0.0017) (0.0097)
β4 0.0028 0.0096 0.0044
∗∗ 0.0052
(0.0030) (0.0097) (0.0018) (0.0092)
β5 0.0007 0.0104 0.0052
∗∗∗ 0.0052
(0.0031) (0.0098) (0.0020) (0.0094)
β6 -0.0007 0.0210
∗ 0.0044∗∗ 0.0166
(0.0032) (0.0122) (0.0022) (0.0116)
β7 -0.0037 0.0092 0.0030 0.0062
(0.0034) (0.0113) (0.0020) (0.0108)
β8 -0.0033 0.0226
∗ 0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0156
(0.0037) (0.0119) (0.0026) (0.0113)
β9 -0.0042 0.0105 0.0052 0.0053
(0.0048) (0.0144) (0.0032) (0.0132)
φ -0.0055∗∗∗ -0.0122∗∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0121∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0038) (0.0007) (0.0036)
N 251783 251783 251783 251783
R2 0.193 0.002 0.000 0.002
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by region of entry per year of entry. Regressions
include dummies for year of entry, region of entry, region of birth and current year. See equation 1 for
the interpretation of φ, β and ψ coefficients. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,* significant at
10%.
Table A8: The effect of initial and contemporaneous labor market conditions on weekly
wage and individual level injuries: Including only entrants born in the South and Islands
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(wage) All injuries IC injuries NIC injuries
ψ1 0.0801
∗∗∗ 0.0759 0.0119 0.0639
(0.0149) (0.0627) (0.0171) (0.0637)
ψ2 0.1568
∗∗∗ -0.0323 0.0194 -0.0517
(0.0243) (0.0634) (0.0209) (0.0604)
ψ3 0.2192
∗∗∗ -0.0552 0.0352 -0.0903
(0.0343) (0.0844) (0.0256) (0.0809)
ψ4 0.2789
∗∗∗ -0.0528 0.0173 -0.0701
(0.0432) (0.0910) (0.0288) (0.0870)
ψ5 0.3338
∗∗∗ -0.0470 0.0283 -0.0753
(0.0530) (0.1172) (0.0319) (0.1160)
ψ6 0.3732
∗∗∗ -0.0502 0.0397 -0.0899
(0.0656) (0.1272) (0.0353) (0.1223)
ψ7 0.3998
∗∗∗ -0.0610 0.0220 -0.0830
(0.0745) (0.1393) (0.0416) (0.1303)
ψ8 0.4202
∗∗∗ -0.0438 0.0278 -0.0716
(0.0838) (0.1630) (0.0473) (0.1537)
ψ9 0.4776
∗∗∗ -0.0133 0.0632 -0.0765
(0.1090) (0.1993) (0.0488) (0.1955)
β0 0.0060
∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗ 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.0082
(0.0018) (0.0057) (0.0023) (0.0057)
β1 0.0060
∗∗∗ 0.0105∗ 0.0054∗∗ 0.0051
(0.0017) (0.0054) (0.0023) (0.0053)
β2 0.0065
∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗ 0.0105∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0055) (0.0022) (0.0052)
β3 0.0064
∗∗∗ 0.0182∗∗∗ 0.0041∗ 0.0141∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0058) (0.0022) (0.0054)
β4 0.0058
∗∗∗ 0.0189∗∗∗ 0.0058∗∗ 0.0131∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0058) (0.0023) (0.0055)
β5 0.0049
∗∗ 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0061) (0.0023) (0.0059)
β6 0.0038
∗ 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0062) (0.0026) (0.0056)
β7 0.0039
∗ 0.0204∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗ 0.0143∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0062) (0.0024) (0.0057)
β8 0.0044
∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗ 0.0153∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0067) (0.0025) (0.0066)
β9 0.0029 0.0224
∗∗∗ 0.0049 0.0175∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0085) (0.0034) (0.0078)
φ -0.0073∗∗∗ -0.0174∗∗∗ -0.0008 -0.0166∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0021) (0.0005) (0.0020)
N 110899 110899 110899 110899
R2 0.095 0.005 0.001 0.005
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by region of entry per year of entry. Regressions
include dummies for year of entry, region of entry, region of birth and current year. See equation 1 for
the interpretation of φ, β and ψ coefficients. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,* significant at
10%.
Table A9: The effect of initial and contemporaneous labor market conditions on weekly
wage and individual level injuries: Controlling for initial job and firm characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(wage) All injuries IC injuries NIC injuries
ψ1 0.1035
∗∗∗ -0.0563∗ -0.0227∗∗ -0.0337
(0.0111) (0.0297) (0.0091) (0.0282)
ψ2 0.2213
∗∗∗ -0.0955∗∗ -0.0188∗ -0.0767∗
(0.0210) (0.0407) (0.0107) (0.0396)
ψ3 0.3134
∗∗∗ -0.1348∗∗ -0.0236∗ -0.1112∗∗
(0.0312) (0.0584) (0.0136) (0.0551)
ψ4 0.3998
∗∗∗ -0.2002∗∗∗ -0.0530∗∗∗ -0.1472∗∗
(0.0409) (0.0764) (0.0173) (0.0739)
ψ5 0.4658
∗∗∗ -0.2176∗∗ -0.0547∗∗ -0.1629∗
(0.0513) (0.0910) (0.0210) (0.0876)
ψ6 0.5325
∗∗∗ -0.2358∗∗ -0.0667∗∗ -0.1692∗
(0.0624) (0.1055) (0.0259) (0.1008)
ψ7 0.5891
∗∗∗ -0.2501∗∗ -0.0714∗∗ -0.1787
(0.0704) (0.1260) (0.0293) (0.1227)
ψ8 0.6419
∗∗∗ -0.3017∗∗ -0.0786∗∗ -0.2231
(0.0821) (0.1435) (0.0334) (0.1356)
ψ9 0.6931
∗∗∗ -0.3132∗∗ -0.0920∗∗∗ -0.2211
(0.0938) (0.1564) (0.0347) (0.1540)
β0 0.0141
∗∗∗ 0.0067∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0022
(0.0017) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0036)
β1 0.0129
∗∗∗ 0.0077∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0032
(0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0015) (0.0034)
β2 0.0112
∗∗∗ 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗ 0.0053∗
(0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0031)
β3 0.0097
∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗ 0.0085∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0015) (0.0032)
β4 0.0078
∗∗∗ 0.0148∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0102∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0034) (0.0014) (0.0035)
β5 0.0065
∗∗∗ 0.0181∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0037) (0.0015) (0.0038)
β6 0.0043
∗ 0.0191∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0038) (0.0017) (0.0037)
β7 0.0028 0.0163
∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0043) (0.0015) (0.0041)
β8 0.0018 0.0204
∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0036) (0.0017) (0.0036)
β9 0.0006 0.0211
∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0058) (0.0019) (0.0055)
φ -0.0091∗∗∗ -0.0161∗∗∗ -0.0005 -0.0156∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0018) (0.0005) (0.0018)
N 349680 349680 349680 349680
R2 0.271 0.006 0.001 0.006
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by region of entry per year of entry. ***
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,* significant at 10%. Regressions include dummies for year of
entry, region of entry, region of birth and current year. We control also for initial firm (sector, average
number of employees, age) and type of occupation. See equation 1 for the interpretation of φ, β and ψ
coefficients.
Table A10: The effect of initial and contemporaneous labor market conditions on weekly
wage and individual level injuries: Allowing different dynamics for stayers in the entry
firm and movers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(wage) All injuries IC injuries NIC injuries
ψ1 0.1162
∗∗∗ -0.0873∗∗∗ -0.0205∗ -0.0667∗∗
(0.0090) (0.0299) (0.0106) (0.0275)
ψ2 0.2592
∗∗∗ -0.1198∗∗∗ -0.0243∗∗ -0.0955∗∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0336) (0.0118) (0.0312)
ψ3 0.3799
∗∗∗ -0.1788∗∗∗ -0.0424∗∗∗ -0.1364∗∗∗
(0.0202) (0.0381) (0.0125) (0.0341)
ψ4 0.4794
∗∗∗ -0.2288∗∗∗ -0.0658∗∗∗ -0.1630∗∗∗
(0.0251) (0.0469) (0.0171) (0.0437)
ψ5 0.5332
∗∗∗ -0.2299∗∗∗ -0.0431∗∗ -0.1869∗∗∗
(0.0323) (0.0554) (0.0180) (0.0492)
ψ6 0.6214
∗∗∗ -0.3158∗∗∗ -0.0800∗∗∗ -0.2359∗∗∗
(0.0421) (0.0682) (0.0208) (0.0597)
ψ7 0.6424
∗∗∗ -0.2510∗∗∗ -0.0534∗∗ -0.1975∗∗∗
(0.0420) (0.0776) (0.0206) (0.0730)
ψ8 0.6898
∗∗∗ -0.3063∗∗∗ -0.0818∗∗∗ -0.2245∗∗∗
(0.0500) (0.0917) (0.0263) (0.0794)
ψ9 0.7213
∗∗∗ -0.3113∗∗∗ -0.0566∗ -0.2547∗∗
(0.0621) (0.1108) (0.0311) (0.1008)
ψ1,nfe -0.0337
∗∗∗ 0.1085∗∗∗ -0.0009 0.1095∗∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0341) (0.0069) (0.0337)
ψ2,nfe -0.0694
∗∗∗ 0.0856∗∗∗ 0.0120∗ 0.0736∗∗
(0.0099) (0.0299) (0.0062) (0.0290)
ψ3,nfe -0.0984
∗∗∗ 0.1055∗∗∗ 0.0290∗∗∗ 0.0766∗∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0276) (0.0086) (0.0262)
ψ4,nfe -0.1156
∗∗∗ 0.0946∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗ 0.0718∗∗
(0.0114) (0.0267) (0.0088) (0.0278)
ψ5,nfe -0.0989
∗∗∗ 0.0831∗∗∗ -0.0074 0.0905∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0270) (0.0071) (0.0267)
ψ6,nfe -0.1232
∗∗∗ 0.1666∗∗∗ 0.0235∗∗ 0.1431∗∗∗
(0.0178) (0.0279) (0.0099) (0.0281)
ψ7,nfe -0.0837
∗∗∗ 0.0866∗∗ -0.0125 0.0992∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0335) (0.0123) (0.0327)
ψ8,nfe -0.0795
∗∗∗ 0.0991 0.0133 0.0858
(0.0175) (0.0619) (0.0105) (0.0621)
ψ9,nfe -0.0582
∗∗ 0.1015∗∗ -0.0298 0.1313∗∗
(0.0291) (0.0510) (0.0230) (0.0515)
Continues on the next page
Table A10 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(wage) All injuries IC injuries NIC injuries
β0 0.0156
∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0064∗
(0.0018) (0.0032) (0.0016) (0.0034)
β1 0.0137
∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0015) (0.0034)
β2 0.0115
∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0099∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0014) (0.0031)
β3 0.0102
∗∗∗ 0.0169∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0121∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0032) (0.0014) (0.0034)
β4 0.0069
∗∗∗ 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0016) (0.0038)
β5 0.0077
∗∗∗ 0.0197∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0015) (0.0036)
β6 0.0033 0.0295
∗∗∗ 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.0233∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0045) (0.0017) (0.0043)
β7 0.0056
∗ 0.0196∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0053) (0.0016) (0.0054)
β8 0.0052 0.0286
∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0240∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0059) (0.0016) (0.0063)
β9 0.0044 0.0245
∗∗ 0.0022 0.0224∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0104) (0.0026) (0.0101)
β1,nfe 0.0023
∗∗ -0.0028 0.0004 -0.0032
(0.0010) (0.0030) (0.0008) (0.0029)
β2,nfe 0.0026
∗∗∗ -0.0030 -0.0007 -0.0023
(0.0008) (0.0022) (0.0005) (0.0021)
β3,nfe 0.0015 -0.0021 -0.0020
∗∗∗ -0.0001
(0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0006) (0.0022)
β4,nfe 0.0034
∗∗∗ -0.0016 -0.0019∗ 0.0003
(0.0010) (0.0024) (0.0010) (0.0027)
β5,nfe 0.0007 0.0017 0.0011
∗ 0.0006
(0.0013) (0.0029) (0.0006) (0.0028)
β6,nfe 0.0031 -0.0083
∗∗∗ -0.0016 -0.0067∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0030) (0.0011) (0.0028)
β7,nfe -0.0011 -0.0006 0.0009 -0.0014
(0.0015) (0.0036) (0.0010) (0.0034)
β8,nfe -0.0016 -0.0061 -0.0002 -0.0059
(0.0021) (0.0068) (0.0008) (0.0068)
β9,nfe -0.0020 -0.0007 0.0033
∗ -0.0040
(0.0036) (0.0067) (0.0018) (0.0065)
φ -0.0078∗∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0007 -0.0159∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0018) (0.0004) (0.0017)
N 362682 362682 362682 362682
R2 0.167 0.003 0.000 0.003
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by region of entry x year of entry. ***
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,* significant at 10%. Regressions include dummies for year of entry,
region of entry, region of birth and current year. βs coefficients represent the effect of unemployment
at entry in year s. βs,nfe coefficients represent the effect of unemployment at entry in year s in a firm
different from the first employer. See equation 1 for the interpretation of φ and ψ coefficients.
